

Approved For Release 1999/08/05 : CIA-RDP86T00875R000300070044-0

TCP 43-74 23 Oct 74

C 1 of 1

Highlight: Moscow Hardliners Defiant Over Art Show

(Vol. XXV, No. 43)



# **TRENDS**

## **In Communist Propaganda**

### **HIGHLIGHT:**

Moscow Hardliners Defiant Over Art Show - page 19

**Confidential**

23 OCTOBER 1974  
(VOL. XXV, NO. 43)

CONFIDENTIAL

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.



STATSPEC

National Security Information  
Unauthorized disclosure subject to  
criminal sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

23 OCTOBER 1974

## CONTENTS

### USSR-EGYPT

Fahmi Visit Lauded for Accord on Brezhnev Trip, Palestinians . . 1

### COMMUNIST RELATIONS

Warsaw Meeting Opens Drive for 1975 European CP Conference . . . 8

### SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Moscow: Peking Seeks Conflict in Europe, Halt in Detente . . . 12

### INDOCHINA

DRV Endorses Contacts With Thai "People," Rebuffs Government . . 13

DRV Author Hong Chuong Assesses U.S. Power, Detente Policies . . 14

### CHINA

Campaign Seeks Big Boost in Last Quarter Industrial Output . . . 17

### USSR

Moscow Hardliners Appear to Defy Leadership Over Art Show . . . 19

Fedorenko Proposes Reorganization of Gosplan and Ministries . . 22

### NOTES

JCP on Ford Visit; PRC-USSR-Balkans; Castro Speech . . . . . 25

### APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . i

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 OCTOBER 1974

- 1 -

## U S S R - E G Y P T

### FAHMI VISIT LAUDED FOR ACCORD ON BREZHNEV TRIP, PALESTINIANS

The agreement on a Brezhnev visit to Egypt in January has predictably been heralded by Moscow as the major accomplishment of the talks during the 14-18 October visit of an Egyptian Government delegation headed by Foreign Minister Fahmi. To give the news maximum impact, TASS issued an "announcement" on 15 October reporting on the Brezhnev-Fahmi meeting that day and the forthcoming Cairo summit. The announcement in effect constituted a mini-communique on Soviet-Egyptian relations. The final document on the delegation's talks, another TASS "announcement" issued on the 18th, dealt only with the "full accord" between the two sides on the need to reconvene the Geneva conference and to resolve the Palestinian question, in the latter case repeating Brezhnev's support, a week earlier, for a Palestinian "national home." The absence of any reference to bilateral relations in the final document appears to reflect a decision to set aside continuing difficult problems pending the work of "joint specialized committees" which will meet in Cairo and Moscow to prepare for the January summit.

Although Soviet media have not mentioned precise dates for Brezhnev's trip,\* Cairo radio and MENA both reported on 15 October that a meeting between Brezhnev and Sadat would take place on 15 January--a date of commemorative significance, in that Podgorny on 15 January 1971 attended ceremonies commissioning the Aswan hydropower complex.

STATEMENTS ON VISIT      The release of two separate statements on the visit is a departure from the customary practice; usually when Brezhnev receives an Arab official but does not participate in the official talks, such a meeting is reported in the final communique at the end of the visit. In the present case, Moscow presumably desired to give maximum publicity to the agreement on Brezhnev's Cairo visit. Normally invitations for visits and acceptances appear at the end of a final statement on a delegation's talks.

---

\* Cairo's AKHBAR AL-YAWM noted on the 19th that Brezhnev's visit was tentatively scheduled to last four days. Arab media have also indicated that the Cairo visit may be part of a larger tour of the Arab world, with Syria specifically mentioned.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 OCTOBER 1974

- 2 -

The report of the Brezhnev-Fahmi meeting, described by TASS as an "announcement" and by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) as an "official statement," was in essence a short communique on bilateral relations. It expressed the sides' determination to continue strengthening and developing relations of friendship and cooperation on the basis of the May 1971 treaty. Brezhnev emphasized the USSR's "principled course" of "every kind of support" for the Arabs' anti-imperialist struggle, the elimination of the "aftermaths of the Israeli aggression" and the establishment of peace in the Middle East. And Fahmi, on behalf of Egypt and President as-Sadat personally, expressed gratitude for the USSR's "all round assistance and support" for Egypt's economy and "defense potential."

Restriction of the concluding document on the Egyptian delegation's talks to the Palestinian issue and the Geneva conference was apparently not at first anticipated by Cairo media. Thus on the 16th MENA reported that the "joint communique" would deal with the forthcoming summit, the Geneva conference, the Middle East problem, and bilateral relations. By the evening of the 17th the format had apparently been set: MENA provided a fairly accurate summary while Cairo radio said the "joint communique" would define the Soviet and Egyptian attitudes toward the Palestinian issue and the Geneva conference. Seemingly acknowledging that the final statement was much narrower in focus than might have been anticipated, TASS on the 21st reported a Fahmi interview in which he "explained the reasons why a separate statement was adopted on the Palestine issue." Fahmi reportedly said that the statement indicated "a complete identity of Soviet and Egyptian views on the PLO" and reaffirmed the PLO's right to represent the Palestinians at the Geneva conference as an independent participant.

MOSCOW TREATMENT OF  
FAHMI, BREZHNEV VISITS

Soviet media have given selective, generally upbeat coverage of the Fahmi visit, publicizing the two statements

and Gromyko luncheon remarks but confining comment largely to generalities. Assessing the Brezhnev trip as opening up favorable prospects for improving Soviet-Egyptian relations, Moscow has failed to suggest, much less specify, what agreements might result from the summit talks. Moscow media, frequently replaying Arab press comment, have stressed the general themes that Soviet-Egyptian relations are based on long-term strategic and principled considerations, as reflected in the May 1971 friendship and cooperation treaty, that Soviet aid has been generous and reliable, and that Brezhnev's visit will further develop and strengthen the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 OCTOBER 1974

- 3 -

countries' mutual relations. Moscow has stressed the importance it attaches to a "successful" visit. TASS in a dispatch from Cairo on the 21st, for example, citing statements by Fahmi to AKHBAR AL-YAWM, singled out his remarks that Brezhnev's decision to meet with as-Sadat represents "a turning point" and "a reply to all doubts and insinuations" with regard to Soviet-Egyptian relations, and added that the forthcoming summit is to produce results.

That difficult problems remain to be resolved was suggested in the announcement on the Brezhnev-Fahmi talks which said that "a range of matters which could underlie future accords" at a Soviet-Egyptian summit meeting was "defined." Putting it another way, Gromyko, in a luncheon speech on the 16th reported in a Moscow Arabic-language broadcast, said that "issues on the subject of negotiations and the agreements connected with them were defined," and Fahmi at the same luncheon was reported by TASS as declaring that there were no problems "which it would be difficult to solve."

In other remarks, Gromyko appeared bent to impress on the Egyptians Soviet expectations that Cairo should demonstrate its good intentions. Speaking at a luncheon on the 17th--as reported by MENA, but not TASS--Gromyko declared that "all competent departments" in the USSR would begin to prepare for the Brezhnev visit, which "must be crowned with success." He added somewhat cryptically that "as long as there is a firm and stable policy, success must result." And at the airport departure ceremony, according to Cairo radio on the 18th, Gromyko again seemed to suggest concern over Cairo's attitude in remarking that "we will do everything possible to prepare for the meeting. We hope the Egyptian side will do likewise." The Soviet Union and Egypt, he said, must not allow "any person" to interfere in their friendship or to create obstacles in their way.

ARAB MEDIA ON  
BILATERAL PROBLEMS

In the most detailed account available of the course of the Fahmi talks, a Moscow dispatch by Musa Sabri published in the 19 October

AKHBAR AL-YAWM said the Brezhnev-Fahmi meeting gave the "green light" and subsequent talks dealt with "the broad lines of bilateral relations in a bid to avoid any future differences." He made clear that past "charges and countercharges" revolved around Egyptian accusations of inadequate arms deliveries and Soviet complaints of Egyptian press recriminations against the USSR and Cairo's failure to observe the treaty provision on "coordination." Musa Sabri insisted that neither side assumed that the aim of the visit

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 OCTOBER 1974

- 4 -

was to conclude new agreements, but rather that they agreed "on a specific program of action in various fields" and focused on present and future cooperation "in a new climate of mutual confidence and understanding."

Indicating various topics under consideration, Musa Sabri observed that at his meeting with Fahmi, Brezhnev had three files on military aid, economic aid, and "the Egyptian information campaign," as well as a copy of the treaty. The talks, he revealed, covered debt rescheduling, Soviet-Egyptian coordination of stands and consultations ("otherwise," the Soviet Union would merely be an "arms merchant" for Egypt), and Soviet recognition of Egypt's "political influence." The question of Egyptian-U.S. relations was not a point of contention, Musa Sabri maintained, noting that Brezhnev said the USSR had nothing against such relations and "itself now deals with the United States."

More specific on aid projects, a MENA report on the 16th, citing sources in the Fahmi delegation, referred to Egypt's request for a new steel and iron complex, a nuclear reactor, and a nuclear plant for generating electric power. It added that the sources were optimistic that problems in the areas of trade and technology could be resolved. And the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY (INA) on the 19th, citing "observers in Moscow," mentioned Moscow's "agreement in principle to provide Egypt with nuclear reactors to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

MILITARY AID      Soviet media have not indicated whether during the Fahmi visit any agreements or understandings were reached on the question of further Soviet military aid for Egypt, although references to favorable prospects for such aid had occurred before and early in the visit. Moscow radio's Arabic service on the 14th, for instance, citing the Egyptian newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH, told its listeners that talks during the Fahmi delegation's visit would help develop Soviet-Egyptian military and economic relations. Such references were not followed up or repeated in later Soviet comment.

The question of military aid was almost certainly discussed, however, in view of the fact that the chief of staff of the Egyptian armed forces, Lieutenant General al-Jamasi, was a member of the Fahmi delegation to Moscow and, according to Moscow radio, met at least once on 16 October with the chief of the Soviet General Staff, Army General V. Kulikov. Only Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress has commented on these talks, stating

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 OCTOBER 1974

- 5 -

uninformatively that they were friendly and covered "issues of mutual interest." RPP implied in this context, however, that additional Soviet military aid was being or would be granted to Egypt, noting that "Soviet military aid is important to the Arabs in their conflict with Israel" and quoting the Egyptian War Minister as having said recently that "the Soviet Union is generously giving us all kinds of modern arms."

Arab media have speculated on the results on the Fahmi delegation's talks on military-related matters. INA on the 20th, for example, citing Egyptian sources, asserted that al-Jamasi's negotiations with Soviet military officials had been "very successful," but added that "the reports did not publish any details." A commentary broadcast by Cairo's Voice of the Arabs on the 18th mentioned, almost in passing, that the Soviet-Egyptian joint statement on the Palestinian question had been issued "in addition to what has been agreed upon between the two countries in the fields of trade, industry, mutual cooperation, and military support."

PALESTINIAN ISSUE, The statement on the 18th issued at the  
GENEVA CONFERENCE conclusion of the Fahmi visit made the  
Palestinians' right to the creation of a  
"national home" a condition of a Middle East political settlement. Just a week previously, in his 11 October Kishinev speech, Brezhnev had put the Soviet Union on record for the first time as supporting the Palestinians' right to "their own national home" (ochag). Earlier, Podgornyy, in an 8 September speech in Sofia, had endorsed the Palestinians' "sovereign right to establish their own statehood in one form or another."

Moscow also came out firmly with Cairo for "independent participation" of representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization "on equal terms" with other participants in the Geneva peace conference. Moscow had waffled on this issue earlier: The communique on Fahmi's visit to Moscow last January had supported Palestinian representation but not explicitly a PLO delegation. Then Brezhnev in his 14 June Supreme Soviet election speech spoke of the joint efforts of "states" taking part in the Geneva talks, with no mention of a Palestinian presence. The 3 July communique on the Nixon-Brezhnev summit skirted the problem in asserting that the two countries, as co-chairmen of the Geneva conference, considered that it should resume as soon as possible with "the question of other participants from the Middle East area to be discussed at the conference." But the communique on the visit of a PLO delegation to Moscow in early August expressed Soviet support for PLO participation "on an equal footing" with other delegations.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 OCTOBER 1974

In the 18 October document, the sides also expressed satisfaction with the 14 October General Assembly resolution inviting the PLO to participate in deliberations on the question of Palestine. While the statement quoted the language of the UNGA resolution inviting the PLO as "the representative of the Palestinian people," MENA's 16 October advance report on the final Soviet-Egyptian statement said it would welcome the UNGA invitation to the PLO "as the sole representative" of the Palestinians.

The statement also recorded the two sides' view that a full political settlement must be achieved within the framework of the Geneva conference, and that Egypt and the USSR would work for resumption of the conference "at the earliest date." Cairo media indicated that the Egyptians explained their problem of first coordinating the Arab front before proceeding to Geneva: MENA on the 16th cited Fahmi as saying that the Soviet Union appreciated Egypt's stand that it could not go to Geneva until the Arab ranks were unified in a single front. And Musa Sabri, in his 19 October AKHBAR AL-YAWM article, also referred to "full appreciation" of Egypt's "essential" role in coordinating the Arab stand. Musa Sabri also noted that while the sides believed there could be no final solution outside the Geneva conference, both would welcome any progress in bringing about a new withdrawal within the framework of continuing Israeli-Arab disengagement "under the military phase" of the situation.

BACKGROUND ON RELATIONS Since the October 1973 war, high-level Soviet-Egyptian visits have been confined to Fahmi's 21-24 January talks in Moscow to acquaint the Soviet leaders, according to Cairo radio, with the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement, and to Gromyko's 1-5 March talks in Cairo.\* Fahmi also met with Gromyko while in New York in April and with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington in mid-August, and Hijazi, then first deputy prime minister, met with Podgornyy when both were in Sofia in early September for Bulgarian anniversary ceremonies.

Following an exchange of recriminations between Moscow and Cairo last spring,\*\* Soviet-Egyptian relations seemingly had taken a turn for the better by mid-May, when as-Sadat described a communication from

---

\* The visits are discussed in the TRENDS of 23 January 1974, pages 3-4, 30 January 1974, pages 1-3, and 6 March 1974, pages 1-6.

\*\* Soviet-Egyptian charges and countercharges are reviewed in the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages 7-8, and 24 April 1974, pages 1-4.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 OCTOBER 1974

- 7 -

Brezhnev as "cordial" and expressing "the beginning of a more positive phase" in relations. President as-Sadat reportedly handed his reply to Soviet Ambassador Polyakov on 6 June; characterizing this letter as welcoming the opening of a "new page" in relations, AKHBAR AL-YAWM had said that as-Sadat would soon send Fahmi to Moscow to meet with Soviet leaders. And Fahmi confirmed this at an Egyptian cabinet meeting on 11 June at which he said, according to Cairo radio, that he would prepare a Soviet-Egyptian summit meeting. Fahmi's visit was scheduled to begin 15 July, but less than a week before his departure Cairo announced that the Soviet leadership had requested a postponement until October so that "sufficient preparations" could be made for the meeting.

That the Fahmi visit postponement still rankled was evident in a Musa Sabri article in AL-AKBAR on 13 October, on the eve of the delegation's visit. In a barbed welcome to Brezhnev's remark in his Kishinev speech that the Middle East might erupt any time if procrastination continued, Musa Sabri observed that "for the very reasons" Brezhnev gave in his statement, Egypt had been anxious not to waste time and was therefore "astonished" when Moscow postponed the Fahmi visit last summer.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 OCTOBER 1974

- 8 -

## COMMUNIST RELATIONS

## WARSAW MEETING OPENS DRIVE FOR 1975 EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE

The call for convening an all-European communist party conference in 1975 issued by the 16-18 October Warsaw "consultative" meeting of 28 European communist parties represents the first formal organizational move in the drive to convene a new world communist party conference. Some evidence that Moscow is willing to pay the price of such gatherings by tolerating more diversity in the communist movement was indicated by the attendance at Warsaw of three independently oriented parties--the Romanian, Yugoslav, and Norwegian--which had boycotted the last European communist party conference at Karlovy Vary in April 1967. Other evidence symbolizing the current effort to make public gestures of accommodation was the announcement by Warsaw on the 10th, by Moscow the next day, and in the final communique on the Warsaw conclave that it had been called on the initiative of the Italian as well as the Polish communist parties. At the same time, adherence to past positions in speeches by Soviet delegate Ponomarev on the one hand, and by the Romanian, Yugoslav, and Italian CP delegates on the other suggests that more difficulties are likely to impede the convening of a European and an eventual world communist party conference. As in 1967, the Albanian, Netherlands, and Icelandic CP's boycotted the Warsaw proceedings.

The 18 October final communique registered the participating parties' "desire" that a conference of all European communist parties be held in East Germany "no later than mid-1975," preceded by a preparatory meeting this December or January. It recorded agreement on the central subject of the planned conference: "The Struggle for Peace, Security, Cooperation, and Social Progress in Europe." Speakers at the meeting envisioned that the European communist conference would take place after the windup of the European Security Conference.

Whereas the communique on the 1967 Karlovy Vary conference had referred only briefly to free and broad discussion at that gathering, the Warsaw meeting communique went out of its way to stress that the proceedings had been based on "equal rights, respect for the views of all parties, and a desire to achieve a common standpoint," principles which the participants specified should prevail in the further preparations and the final conference. The mutual understanding and proletarian internationalism displayed at the meeting,

CONFIDENTIAL

23 OCTOBER 1974

- 9 -

it added, were "in complete accordance with normal relations between fraternal parties." While communist media gave no hint of controversy in the Warsaw proceedings, Rome's ANSA on the 18th carried a denial by the Italian CP delegation head, Pajetta, that there had been any discussion of a possible anti-Peking resolution at the forthcoming European CP conference.

Low-keyed Soviet followup comment stressed that the Warsaw meeting and the planned European CP conference would strengthen detente. A Moscow domestic service commentary on the 19th recalled that Brezhnev--in his first public statement of support for a European CP conference--had declared at Katowice on 20 July that such a conference would promote "joint action" toward further relaxing tensions on the continent. The weekly Moscow domestic service roundtable discussion on the 20th wound up with remarks stressing that the European communist parties can, through their deliberations, make the process of detente irreversible.

## PONOMAREV SPEECH

Although Soviet delegation head Ponomarev included a reference to open discussion at the forthcoming conference in his 16 October speech, he took a tougher line than the final communique in stressing the need for unity and concerted action by the European CP's to overcome the obstacles to detente. Thus, he declared that convening a European communist conference was prompted not only by the interests of the European peoples but by "the immediate interests of the European communist movement," adding that the conference would promote "further cohesion of the world communist movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." Presumably alluding to the Chinese, among others, the CPSU Politburo member and secretary went on to note that the European CP conference would aid the struggle against "all kinds of anticommunism" and for "the Marxist-Leninist outlook." Ponomarev proposed that the planned conference adopt two documents--a "political" one detailing a program of joint actions, and another addressing an appeal to the European peoples. Both documents, he declared, "must express the joint and agreed view of all" conference participants. This consensus, he added, would not preclude each party's voicing its own individual views in conference speeches and formulating the documents, in accordance with "democratic norms" and equality.

Ponomarev's speech was carried only in summary form, by TASS on the 17th and in PRAVDA the next day.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 OCTOBER 1974

- 10 -

ROMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA      Bucharest and Belgrade waited until just before the Warsaw meeting opened to reveal their decisions to participate in the gathering, and both warned that they would participate in the continued preparations and the conference itself only if their views on international party conferences were not violated. Thus, the Romanian Communist Party Executive Committee was reported by Bucharest radio on the 15th as deciding, on a motion by Ceausescu, to participate in the Warsaw meeting. The decision, reported only as one of several actions on various subjects at the Executive Committee session, reiterated Bucharest's stand that "all" parties--including those who do not want to join in "compulsory" decisions or in criticism of other parties--should be invited to and participate in international communist party conferences.

While the other participating East European countries, including Yugoslavia, publicized the contents of their delegates' speeches during the course of the Warsaw meeting, the Romanians waited until four days after it ended. An article by the delegation head, RCP secretary Andrei, in the 22 October SCINTEIA reported on the stand he had taken at the gathering, in accordance with the "mandate" which he said had been spelled out by Ceausescu. Andrei reported among other things that he had served notice at the meeting that the RCP was "committed by statutory documents and decisions not to subscribe in any way to actions attacking and blaming other parties." At the Moscow international party conference in June 1969 Ceausescu had signed "with reservations" the main conference document, which had registered only muted criticism of dissident views without mentioning the Chinese. Andrei's current article declares in effect that the RCP's participation in the preparations for and convening of even a European CP conference would depend on respect for "each party's independence and autonomy."

Yugoslav participation in the Warsaw meeting was revealed officially in a TANJUG report on the 15th that an LCY delegation, headed by Executive Committee secretary Grlickov, had left that day for the Polish capital. The report was amplified only by a statement that at the meeting "views will be exchanged on convening a conference of communist parties of our continent." Also on the 15th, a talk by Zagreb radio's outspoken commentator Sundic dismissed alleged Western speculation that Belgrade's participation in the meeting meant that Yugoslavia was turning toward the socialist community, that it had been subjected to "an immediate threat" by the socialist camp, or that there was any connection between its participation and the recent trial of Cominformist groups in Yugoslavia.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 OCTOBER 1974

- 11 -

Grlickov's speech in Warsaw on the 17th, carried in full by TANJUG the same day, did little to improve relations between the LCY and the CPSU. Stressing that the situation confronting the communist movement today was completely different from that in "past decades," the Yugoslav delegate ruled out any direction of the movement from "one center" or institutionalizing international consultations as a means of working out common strategy. With obvious particular reference to the 1960 Moscow conference, which had roundly denounced "Yugoslav revisionism," Grlickov declared that a European communist party conference must not be treated as "a continuation" of previous conferences. He added that neither should a European gathering deal with the holding of a new world party conference, since the conditions for such a conference "are absent." A Warsaw-dated dispatch published in the French CP's L'HUMANITE on the 18th noted that the Yugoslav speech was the only one to refer directly to a "world" party conference. Stressing that the problems of Europe today were "very complex," Grlickov said in conclusion that his party would decide later whether to participate in further preparations for a European CP conference.

ITALIAN CP      On behalf of one of the two parties which had organized the Warsaw meeting, the Italian CP's Pajetta declared at the opening session that he anticipated "a free, frank, and profound confrontation of views between our parties, on the basis of equality." The speech, as reported by L'UNITA on the 17th, also ruled out criticism of absent parties. Reasserting the principle of unity in diversity, Pajetta told the meeting that "unity is a result of the combination of the experiences of the workers movement of every country," each nation's peculiarities, and each party's autonomy.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 OCTOBER 1974

- 12 -

## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## MOSCOW: PEKING SEEKS CONFLICT IN EUROPE, HALT IN DETENTE

Recent remarks by Chinese leaders regarding a "unified" Germany and detente during their talks with West German legislators visiting Peking have produced an outpouring of Moscow radio and press comment accusing Peking of seeking to wreck detente and encourage East-West conflict in Europe.\* The Soviet reaction included a 19 October commentary by PRAVDA's authoritative Yuriy Zhukov warning against the "dangerous noise" of the "Peking firebrands."

Zhukov, focusing on Western reports of PRC Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's statements to the FRG Bundestag delegation that peace cannot last for a whole generation and that the threat to peace in Europe comes from the USSR, accused the Chinese of resurrecting the "NATO myth" that "the only thing to be seen on the European plains are Soviet divisions ready to pounce on the West." Zhukov went on to denounce alleged Peking support for a more powerful NATO, an expanded arms race, and "a new military grouping of West European states which would serve as a NATO subsidiary." He accused the Chinese of ulterior motives, saying they wished to "warm their hands over a thermonuclear fire after causing a clash between socialist and capitalist countries." Underlining the importance Moscow attaches to the Teng pronouncements, Zhukov made a rare Soviet acknowledgment of the vice premier's rising stature in the Chinese hierarchy, stating that recent reports show that "since the illness of Premier Chou En-lai he has been substituting for him."

Other Soviet comment has sought to link Teng's reported remarks on war with Peking's endorsement of a unified Germany and its reported invitation to the FRG opposition leader Strauss to visit China early in 1975, describing this as Chinese fostering of a "repetition of Hitler's crusade against communism." Much of the Soviet comment has replayed Zhukov's view that Peking seeks to destroy detente and stir up an East-West conflict in Europe, but a 21 October commentary on Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress went further, raising the specter of a common China-West European front against Moscow. The commentator noted that neo-fascists in the West hope that Peking's support for NATO would lead to a "common West European-Chinese strategy against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."

---

\* For background on Chinese remarks to FRG legislators showing Peking's heightened support for a unified Germany, see the TRENDS of 17 October 1974, page 17.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 OCTOBER 1974

- 13 -

## INDOCHINA

## DRV ENDORSES CONTACTS WITH THAI "PEOPLE," REBUFFS GOVERNMENT

Reflecting a new, more positive dimension in DRV policy toward Thailand, a DRV Foreign Ministry information department spokesman declared in an interview with VNA that Hanoi is interested in developing contacts with the Thai "people," even though official DRV-Thai exchanges must await a change in Bangkok's "hostile" policy toward Vietnam. The VNA interview was released on 18 October, in response to comment in Thai media two days earlier that Bangkok government officials had welcomed reports from a Thai visitor to Hanoi that alleged the director of North Vietnam's commission on foreign cultural relations had expressed approval "in principle" for cultural exchanges.

Stressing that contacts at this time must be limited, the spokesman took issue with "distorted reports" circulated by Thai officials concerning developing bilateral contacts, asserting they are designed to "soothe public opinion" and to "sidetrack" the Thai people's struggle against Bangkok's pro-U.S. policies. Because of Thailand's "hostile policy toward Vietnam and Indochina," he advised, "it is unrealistic for the Thai administration to talk about improving relations between the two countries." He charged specifically that "Thai authorities have sold out Thailand's independence and sovereignty" to the United States and have not drawn the "appropriate lessons" from the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina in the wake of the Paris and Vientiane agreements, and he attacked Bangkok's continued tolerance of U.S. bases in Thailand and its aid for Thieu in South Vietnam. Concluding on a positive note, the spokesman advised that Bangkok's policy "can by no means" prevent the development of friendly relations between the "peoples" of Thailand and Vietnam, who "in their own interests" should have "contacts and join efforts" to preserve their "longstanding relations of friendship."

Though the full implications of Hanoi's demarche are not yet clear, the spokesman's comment comes against a background of recently active Hanoi efforts pressing for a change in the Sanya government's policy of supporting the United States in Indochina and allowing U.S. military forces to remain in Thailand. After an authoritative

CONFIDENTIAL

23 OCTOBER 1974

- 14 -

NHAN DAN "Observer" article in May 1974 specified that such a shift represented a basic precondition for improved DRV-Thai relations, Hanoi issued a steady stream of authoritative comment focused against Bangkok's pro-U.S. stance.\* The present spokesman's interview, by adding the specific enticement of bilateral cultural contacts to encourage Thailand to change its ways, suggests that Hanoi intends to use both the carrot of bilateral exchange and the stick of propaganda attacks on Bangkok policies in pushing for a change in the Sanya government's ties with the United States.

#### DRV AUTHOR HONG CHUONG ASSESSES U.S. POWER, DETENTE POLICIES

U.S. policies of detente with Moscow and rapprochement with Peking have been assailed in a recent three-part Hanoi radio talk attributed to Hong Chuong--an assistant editor of the DRV party journal HOC TAP who authored remarkably frank articles in the 1960's criticizing the Soviets and Chinese. Hong Chuong's talk was broadcast in Vietnamese in three daily installments beginning on 8 October and was summarized in Hanoi's Mandarin-language broadcasts beginning on the 14th. The timing of his attack on U.S. policies of detente, like the timing of the most recent government statements issued by the PRG and DRV on 8 and 11 October respectively, may be related to Secretary Kissinger's scheduled 23-27 October Moscow visit.\*\* There are precedents in Vietnamese communist propaganda that suggest a pattern of deliberate activity timed to coincide with U.S. diplomatic initiatives involving Hanoi's allies. Thus, for example, the last previous PRG statement was issued on 22 March, two days before Secretary Kissinger's arrival for talks in Moscow, and a major Hanoi propaganda assault was launched against U.S. overtures to socialist states last fall before the Secretary's scheduled visit to Peking.

Hong Chuong restates the long-standing Vietnamese communist contention that Washington is attempting to divide the socialist countries with its detente policy and that it is improving relations

---

\* For background on Hanoi's recent view of Thailand see the TRENDS of 2 October 1974, pages S1-S3.

\*\* The PRG and DRV government statements are discussed respectively, in the TRENDS of 8 October 1974, pages 11-12, and 17 October 1974, pages 8-9.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 OCTOBER 1974

- 15 -

with the big socialist states in order to promote cultural and ideological inroads and concentrate on opposing the small socialist countries. At the same time, Hong Chuong suggests a more sanguine Hanoi appraisal of U.S. efforts than was reflected in its propaganda a year ago. In a series of articles last November and December the military commentator "Chien Binh" (Combatant) had used strident terms in warning that the United States was attempting to "surround, divide, and intimidate" the socialist camp, "sabotage" the communist movement, "repress" the national liberation movement, and "frantically counterattack" the revolutionary movement.\* By contrast, Hong Chuong emphasizes U.S. weaknesses, claiming that U.S. failure to "encircle and isolate" the socialist system has forced Washington to implement a new policy of developing normal diplomatic relations with a number of socialist countries.

Chien Binh's article a year ago appeared to be criticizing Hanoi's allies when it admonished that detente can only be used to create conditions to launch stronger offensives. Taking a different focus, Hong Chuong seems to reflect less concern that Moscow or Peking has been taken in by the alleged U.S. ploy. He maintains that the "present detente between the U.S. imperialists and a number of socialist countries is only temporary and limited," expresses confidence in the role of the "world socialist system" as a "revolutionary base for our country," and says that the socialist system is "providing firm and stable support to the small and weak countries struggling to protect their fundamental national rights."

Hong Chuong underlines his evaluation of the weakened U.S. position in concluding passages, among other things claiming that recent world developments--including the settlements in Vietnam and Laos, the change of governments in Thailand and Portugal, and events in the Middle East and Cyprus--have demonstrated that the United States no longer holds the same position of strength and that the world balance of forces "has completely changed." Maintaining that the weakened U.S. posture had forced it to resort to "perfidious maneuvers," Hong Chuong derisively notes that Secretary Kissinger has "traveled from one country to another to publicize the so-called interdependence theory designed to undermine the coordinated actions of the small and weak countries" that are opposing "U.S. infiltration." He goes on to suggest that such tactics will fail, since the United States is in a declining position.

---

\* Chien Binh's articles are discussed in the 12 December 1973 TRENDS, pages S1-S5.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 OCTOBER 1974

- 16 -

BACKGROUND      Hong Chuong had previously been a prolific contributor to HOC TAP, publishing at least 34 articles in the journal since it first appeared in 1956; but he has been less prominent in recent years. His last article in HOC TAP was published in May 1971, and since then his only known article was a discourse on literary theory and criticism published in the November-December 1973 issue of the bimonthly literary journal TAP CHI VAN HOC. He appeared in public in 1971 and again in 1973, but is not known to have appeared in 1972.

Many of Hong Chuong's HOC TAP articles dealt with cultural subjects, but particularly beginning in 1963, he wrote significant commentaries on the situation in South Vietnam and world developments. Among other things, he was the author of radical attacks on Soviet and Chinese policies: The controversial nature of a November 1964 Hong Chuong article, hailing Khrushchev's ouster two months earlier, was demonstrated when Hanoi authorities deleted the article from issues of HOC TAP after initial copies had already been released. A May 1967 HOC TAP article by Hong Chuong launched a thinly veiled attack on the Chinese cultural revolution, among other things, warning against the deification of a leader.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
23 OCTOBER 1974

- 17 -

## CHINA

## CAMPAIGN SEEKS BIG BOOST IN LAST QUARTER INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT

Peking seems determined to increase PRC industrial output significantly in the fourth quarter of 1974, placing special attention on light industry, following a disappointing industrial performance during the first three quarters. Peking and provincial media comment stresses that the increases will result from carrying out the anti-Lin Biao and Confucius campaign, although the shift to light industry probably is prompted by good crops this year, which furnish a material base for better performance.

Complementing the production drive, Peking continues to press the themes of party control and revolutionary unity as part of the anti-Lin and Confucius campaign. These themes--which have dominated the movement since this summer when provincial radios reported economic dislocations resulting from the previous radical stage of the movement--were again sounded in an October RED FLAG article on unity, indicating that problems are continuing. The article, broadcast by Peking radio on 20 October, argued that if revolutionary unity was weakened it would lead to "losses to our revolution and production." The article criticized cadres who "feel unhappy about the masses' criticism and instigate conflicting sentiments among the masses" and it cautioned cadres holding differing views to "seek common ground on major points while reserving differences on minor points."

The need to continue the campaign under tight party control also continues to be emphasized in provincial broadcasts. Sining radio on 17 October, for example, urged party members to pay more attention to "self-criticism" and to "refrain from picking on the shortcomings or mistakes of others." The broadcast also called on cadres to lead the masses toward unity and to struggle against "words and deeds that weaken or break away from the leadership of the party" or "violate party discipline."

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION      The turn towards promoting light industry has thus far been displayed most strongly in Kwangtung, where a 14 October industrial rally and an 18 October NANFANG DAILY editorial devoted renewed

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 OCTOBER 1974

- 18 -

attention to the need for promoting light industrial production. The theme may be national in scope, at least for provinces with similar conditions; according to the Canton rally report, broadcast by Canton radio on the 18th, the rally proposals were adopted after "the essence of the party Central Committee's directive on present industrial production" was explained. The light industry theme was picked up by Anhwei province on 22 October, with a progress report and an ANHWEI DAILY editorial.

The Canton rally and editorial both called for using the ideological movement to increase production, stressing the control aspects of the campaign. The editorial in particular stated that cadres must "dare to control the class struggle" and singled out "veteran workers" as the group to be most relied on.

Other provinces have also called for a production surge in the fourth quarter, but without singling out light industry for attention. A 20 October Hopei report on a provincial meeting cited as a unit's criterion of success in the campaign whether "it can fulfill and overfulfill the state plan in an all-around way." Similarly, a HUNAN DAILY editorial broadcast by Changsha radio on 17 October put local units on notice that production levels would be used to determine how well criticism of Lin and Confucius has been carried out. The editorial argued that greater party leadership over workers was essential to meet fourth-quarter production goals and it called upon all party committees to "assign persons specifically responsible for control over production."

BACKGROUND ON LIGHT  
INDUSTRY CAMPAIGN

The last time China made a major push in light industry was in the summer and fall of 1972. That shift also took advantage of a good agricultural crop, but it also seemed to be related to changes in line following the Lin Piao affair and the decline in influence of PLA leaders. An article in RED FLAG No. 6 for 1972, announcing the new stress on light industry, criticized "imperialist and social imperialist countries" where "industry, especially military industry, has developed abnormally."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 OCTOBER 1974

- 19 -

## U S S R

## MOSCOW HARDLINERS APPEAR TO DEFY LEADERSHIP OVER ART SHOW

The leadership of Moscow's Cheremushki district party committee, whose suppression of an art exhibit in Moscow a month ago caused an international scandal, was singled out in the Moscow organization's newspaper MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA on 17 October as a model for other district committees to follow in handling ideological work. Coming a month after the top party leadership had reversed the district committee's action and allowed the art show to be presented, and two weeks after the first secretary of the offending district committee was dismissed allegedly for mishandling the affair, the editorial amounts, in effect, to a defiance of the leadership for its handling of the affair.

ART SHOW FIASCO      The art show fiasco began on 15 September, when a group of artists attempted to hold an abstract art exhibit in a field in Cheremushki district, after Moscow city executive committee officials had refused to issue a permit. The violent breaking up of the exhibit and roughing up of foreign newsmen by a gang of plainclothes militia-men brought a wave of extremely bad publicity in the Western press.

Initially the suppression was defended in broadcasts beamed abroad and in a letter published in the 20 September SOVIET CULTURE. Then Moscow executive committee official N.Ya. Sychev, formerly head of the city party committee's ideology section, held a 28 September press conference specifically to counter the "incorrect, distorted" reporting of the event in the foreign press and to deny that there had been any "crushing of the exhibit."

However, this line was apparently judged insufficient by some higher level officials. On 29 September, the same day Sychev's statements appeared in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, a second modern art show was permitted without interference and, according to Western reports, drew thousands of visitors. This was followed by an even more unusual slap at the Moscow organization and its policies. On 9 October it was announced that the first secretary of the offending district committee, B.N. Chaplin, had been removed at an 8 October district party committee plenum. No hint of the reasons was given in the MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA account, but foreign newsmen were immediately tipped off by unidentified "Soviet sources" that Chaplin's removal was punishment for mishandling the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 OCTOBER 1974

- 20 -

art show and that Moscow city party committee ideology secretary V.N. Yagodkin was also apparently implicated in the affair. This was reported in the New York TIMES on 10 October. Despite the implicit rebuke to Yagodkin, he has as yet suffered no evident loss of authority and continues to function as Moscow's ideology boss.

**MOSCOW'S HARDLINERS**      The Moscow City leadership has earned a well-deserved reputation in recent years for advocating and applying repressive policies against the liberal intelligentsia. Both the dismissed first secretary of the Cheremushki district party committee, V.N. Chaplin, and the Moscow City party committee's ideology secretary, V.N. Yagodkin, have contributed to this reputation.

Chaplin's views were set forth in an article in the May 1974 **KOMMUNIST** which reviewed the work of his district committee with the scientific-technical intelligentsia. He noted that his district is Moscow's "science district," where half of all party members work in scientific institutes. He stressed the importance of ideological war, attacked "technocratism" (read "apoliticism"), and assailed scholars who "nibble at the bait" of "humanization" and "liberalization." He particularly complained about scientists who thought scholars could stick to "pure science" and who argued for a "division of labor" whereby party organizations would handle ideological work and not "overburden" specialists with public activities.

Chaplin's views appear close to those of Yagodkin, who seems to have built his career largely by devising ways of forcing scholars to do more ideological study during his tenure as party secretary at Moscow State University. Chaplin first appeared in August 1965 as second secretary of the Oktyabr district, adjacent to the university where Yagodkin was leading party work, and in the December 1968 reorganization of Moscow districts he was chosen to head the newly created Cheremushki district south of the university.

Meanwhile, Yagodkin's ideological innovations at the university won him promotion to Moscow City party committee ideology secretary in March 1971, and he has since used this position to attack liberal trends in the leading history, philosophy and economic institutes. He has become perhaps the leading spokesman for the theory that detente necessitates ideological tightening up at home and has played one of the leading roles in the 1973-74 crackdown on social

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 OCTOBER 1974

- 21 -

sciences. He lectured the General History Institute on the ideological dangers arising from detente in June 1973, for example.\* He demanded that philosophy become a weapon in the ideological war at a November 1973 Central Committee conference of philosophers, reported in the May 1974 HERALD OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. And he attacked innovative economists such as G.S. Lisichkin and, by implication, N.P. Fedorenko at a November 1973 Central Committee conference of economists, according to the February 1974 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS.

In addition to these public attacks, he indicated in the February QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS article that his city party committee had issued decrees directly intervening in cadre matters at Fedorenko's institute as well as at the Institute of Economics. In a February 1974 KOMMUNIST article he assailed any "technocratic" approach to the economy and again called for an ideological crackdown in the face of detente. Spurred by a Central Committee decree on raising the ideological level of social science teaching at Saratov University and Moscow's Bauman technical school published in the 24 June PRAVDA, Grishin and Yagodka began a new series of meetings in July to tighten up.

---

\* See the Supplementary Article "New Ally for Leader of Soviet Revisionist Historians" in the TRENDS of 1 May 1974.

CONFIDENTIAL

33 OCTOBER 1974

- 22 -

## FEDORENKO PROPOSES REORGANIZATION OF GOSPLAN AND MINISTRIES

In a September QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY article, top Soviet economist N. P. Fedorenko, academic secretary of the Academy of Sciences' economic division, proposes stripping the State Planning Commission, Gosplan, of some of its planning functions and transforming ministries into independent self-financing units. Such an action would represent a major reform and a marked reduction of rigid central planning. Innovator Fedorenko's proposal follows closely on the heels of a similar idea floated in mid-August in TRUD by reform-minded minister K. N. Rudnev. The simultaneous presentation of this idea by two such prominent figures suggests it ranks as one of the major viewpoints being pressed in the current high-level debate over changes in the economic system. Such discussions do not, however, suggest early adoption given the regime's traditional caution about major economic policy shifts.

## REFORM PROPOSALS

Addressing his article to the December plenum's call for changes in the economic system, Fedorenko proposed that Gosplan be relieved of current planning to concentrate on long-range planning and that it be reorganized along "functional" lines instead of the present "branch" lines. This would mean transferring to the ministries responsibility for planning for their own branches. Further, Fedorenko indicated that the ministries should finance their operations and investments from their own profits or from bank loans, rather than from budget allocations. He carefully stressed that this would preserve the principle of centralized planning, while forcing economic units at all levels--ministries, associations and enterprises--to adopt the most efficient planning and investment decisions. One of the key obstacles to the success of the 1965 economic reform was that while enterprises were to operate on the principle of economic accountability, their superior organs--ministries and main administrations--were not. The March 1973 decree on production associations extended the principle of economic accountability upward to production associations, which are replacing main administrations, and Fedorenko's proposal would extend it all the way to the ministerial level.

Fedorenko's proposal dovetails with arguments advanced by Rudnev in a 15 August TRUD article on improving the administrative mechanism. Like Fedorenko, Rudnev, minister of instrument making, automation equipment and control systems, is a leading innovator. At a key May 1968 all-union conference on the economic reform, Rudnev had proposed that his whole ministry be made self-financing. He said this would require that all current planning for his branch be transferred from Gosplan to the ministry. This was finally done in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

29 OCTOBER 1974

- 23 -

April 1970, but Rudnev's ministry has remained the only such self-financed ministry. In his August TRUD article he declared that full self-financing had proved successful in his ministry and should be applied to other ministries, changing them from purely administrative bodies to economically responsible entities. He called for strong, independent ministries which would do their own current planning, rather than depending on Gosplan for this function.

GOSPLAN RESISTANCE Gosplan has been the target of proposals for reorganization for some time, but has been put on the defensive since the December 1973 plenum, which apparently heard sharp attacks on its work. For example, in the wake of the discussion of economic problems at the December 1972 plenum, Gosplan's departments--most of which are organized on branch lines--came under criticism for poor coordination of interbranch problems. These criticisms were noted in a 17 February 1973 TRUD article by Gosplan Deputy Chairman A. V. Bachurin, who rejected suggestions to basically reorganize Gosplan. He also appeared to spike any idea of transferring branch planning to ministries, stressing instead that branch ministries were even less efficient than Gosplan in overseeing interbranch coordination.

However, as Bachurin acknowledged in a 26 August 1974 ECONOMIC GAZETTE article, new demands to transfer some Gosplan functions to ministries were made at the December 1973 plenum. After the plenum Gosplan Chairman Baybakov publicly defended his organization's prerogatives in this regard. In articles on improving planning in the March PLANNED ECONOMY and the 23 May TRUD, he stressed that Lenin himself had oriented Gosplan to handle branch as well as territorial planning and current as well as long term planning and insisted that this coordinated approach to planning was now more important "than ever before." He also took a calculated swing at Gosplan foe Fedorenko, who has been a promoter of mathematical economic methods and the system of optimal functioning of the economy (SOFE). Declaring that no matter how important mathematical economic methodology was, it still remained just one of many methods, he ridiculed "some economists" for overrating it and the "so-called" SOFE.

Bachurin conceded in his August article, however, that perhaps some Gosplan functions could go to ministries. But he attacked the concept of self-financing ministries, declaring that ministries should remain administrative bodies rather than become economically responsible entities.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS TRENDS  
23 OCTOBER 1974

- 24 -

BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN  
POSITIONS UNCLEAR

While the precise attitude of Brezhnev and Kosygin toward the proposals is not clear, Gosplan may not be able to count on their full support. Kosygin's views have appeared to coincide with those of the Gosplan leaders in some respects, but he has also fostered the idea of transferring the subdivisions of ministries (enterprises and production associations) to economic accountability and has helped promote some of Fedorenko's ideas in the past. Brezhnev's repeated assertions that political considerations must take precedence over economic considerations suggest that he would be less than sympathetic to Fedorenko's goal of allowing economic organs to make decisions on purely economic grounds. At the same time Brezhnev has been a frequent critic of Gosplan. At the 24th CPSU Congress, for example, he urged a strengthening of ministries and reduction of Gosplan's current planning functions, and at the December 1973 plenum he called for a comprehensive reorganization of planning.

In any case, the chances for early adoption of the Fedorenko-Rudnev proposals appear slim in view of the regime's tendency to move slowly and cautiously on economic changes. Even the transfer of ministerial subdivisions to economic accountability ordered by the March 1973 decree on production associations is proceeding extremely slowly. Although ministries had been ordered to prepare schemes for reorganizing their main administrations into cost accounting production associations and industrial associations for submission to the Council of Ministers by September 1973, there have been repeated complaints of delay and evasion and the council's approval of the first such schemes was only announced in the 6 September 1974 IZVESTIYA--one year later.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 25 -

## NOTES

JCP ON FORD VISIT: A 21 October statement by the Presidium of the Japan Communist Party has called for a "great national movement" against President Ford's November visit to Tokyo. Evoking the memory of the large demonstrations in 1960 against the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the statement called for formation of "joint struggle" organizations on a scale surpassing those in the 1960 demonstrations which led to cancellation of a planned visit by President Eisenhower. The statement takes advantage of the controversy over the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan that has flared up recently following Congressional testimony by a retired U.S. Navy admiral to link the visit to an alleged attempt by the United States and Japan to "promote transformation of their military alliance into a nuclear military alliance."

PRC-USSR-BALKANS: An 18 October article by PEOPLE'S DAILY international affairs commentator Jen Ku-ping has offered an unusually comprehensive indictment of Soviet policy in the Balkans, charging that Moscow has stepped up its "expansionism" there in the wake of the 1973 Middle East war and this year's Cyprus crisis. The article portrays Moscow as backing the Cominformist group in Yugoslavia and notes Soviet military pressures on Romania, pointing up Soviet military exercises in the Balkans and demands for army transit rights. In an obvious reference to Brezhnev's 11 October speech at Kishinev, Jen denounced unnamed Soviet leaders who "appeared at points on the Soviet borders adjoining the Balkans to boast in person of Russia's history of gobbling up neighboring territories." He also indirectly assailed Moscow's support for Bulgarian claims to parts of Macedonia that are now within Yugoslavia, accusing the Soviets of having "secretly sowed territorial disputes." Lauding the example of Yugoslav-Romanian cooperation shown in the joint communique on Tito's visit to Bucharest in July, Peking called on Balkan nations to strengthen mutual relations and take "powerful measures" to rebuff the "menace of expansionism" posed by the USSR.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

23 OCTOBER 1974

- 26 -

CASTRO SPEECH: For the second time in three weeks Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro has criticized U.S. policies toward the Third World, in an 18 October address to a World Federation of Trade Unions meeting in Havana. Dealing primarily with world economic problems, Castro asserted that "Yankee imperialism" aimed at division of the oil-producing and other Third World countries and that these countries must unite to end the "rapacious exploitation" of the past. As in his 28 September speech, Castro urged OPEC members to invest in underdeveloped rather than industrial nations where the investments would become a "hostage for imperialism". Possibly concerned to assume a firm pose in view of the forthcoming OAS conference--which will consider lifting sanctions imposed against Cuba--Castro declared that the Cuban revolution was becoming "more revolutionary, more internationalist" and more loyal to "the immortal ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin." In reporting Castro's speech on the 19th, TASS described his praise for Latin American efforts against "the interference of monopolies and agreed with his assessment that the blockade of Cuba had failed, but refrained from mentioning his direct criticism of the United States. Soviet media have recently repeated their encouragement for a thaw in U.S.-Cuban relations by approvingly reporting U.S. press articles supporting this view.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 1 -

# A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 14 - 20 OCTOBER 1974

<u>Moscow (2839 items)</u>			<u>Peking (952 items)</u>		
Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi in USSR	(--)	12%	Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius	(5%)	10%
[TASS "Announcements" on Fahmi Talks with Brezhnev, Gromyko	(--)	7%]	Indochina	(7%)	8%
USSR/Finland Armistice, 30th Anniversary	(--)	10%	[Vietnam	(3%)	5%]
[Podgorny Speeches in Finland	(--)	3%]	[Laos	(3%)	2%]
China	(4%)	5%	Danish Prime Minister Hartling in PRC	(--)	8%
PRAVDA Editorial Article on 10th Anniversary CPSU October Plenum	(1%)	4%	UNGA Session	(12%)	7%
Brezhnev Speech to USSR-U.S. Trade, Economic Council	(--)	3%	USSR Balkans Policy	(--)	3%
European Communist and Workers Parties Meeting, Warsaw	(--)	3%			
October Anniversary Slogans	(1%)	3%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.